The most enduring philosophical debate about moral variation concernsmetaethical relativism. Does moral diversity imply that there isno single true morality? On its own, the answer is no. Butsome relativists argue that that there is no source of morality otherthan our attitudes (e.g., they argue for subjectivism), so culturalvariation implies that morality is relative (Prinz, 2007). Othersargue that appeals to cultural history adequately explain why we havemoral values, so there is no pressure to posit a further domain ofvalues that transcend culture (Harman, 1977). These views do notentail that any morality is possible. There may be a plurality ofacceptable value systems, given human nature and the situations we findourselves in (Wong, 2006). Opponents of relativism think suchpluralism is still too generous. Demands of reason (Kant),intrinsic goods (consequentialism), natural conditions for flourishing(Aristotle), ideal observers (Smith), and divine commands have all beenexplored as sources of absolute values.
This recognition of man’s health as more than a biological phenomenon has highlighted the significance of the ontological and emotional component of health and illness (Williams & Bendelow, 1998, pp.
It might seem that we can't settle on the question of whetherculture shapes emotions without deciding between these theories of whatemotions are. On the other hand, the evidence suggests thatculture can influence every aspect of our emotional responses, and thissuggests that, whatever emotions really are, culture can have animpact. It is open to debate whether the impact is sufficientlysignificant to warrant the conclusion that some emotions are socialconstructs.
It doesn't follow that emotions are mere socialconstructions. Rather, it seems that we have biologically basicemotions that can be altered by culture. Whether thesealternations qualify as different emotions or simply differentmanifestations of the same emotion depends on what one takes emotionsto be. The nature of emotions is a matter of considerable debate(Prinz, 2004). For those who take emotions to essentially involvejudgments, constructivist theories of emotion are attractive, becauseculture can influence how people construe situations (Solomon,2002). Constructivism is also appealing to those who think ofemotions as analogous to scripts, which include everything fromcanonical eliciting to conditions to complex behavioral sequalae(Russell, 1991; Goddard, 1996; Goldie, 2000). Those who seeemotions as automatic behavioral programs or patterned bodily changeshave been less inclined towards constructivism (James, 1884; Darwin,1872; Ekman, 1999; though see Prinz, 2002). Griffiths (1997) hasargued that emotions are not a natural kind: some are culturallyconstructed scripts, others are automatic behavioral programs, andothers are evolved strategic responses that unfold over longertimescales.
onas’s second example, image-making, is a capability which “displays a total, rather than a gradual, divergence from the animal’s.” The activity is biologically useless, he notes, and requires sufficient mental abstraction to distinguish between reality and representation — that is, between the sensations of the present moment that all animals experience and the form of something else in memory or the imagination. Image-making is the transference of this metaphysical idea onto a physical substrate; even for a portrait or some other picture modeled on something real and present, the copy is distinct from the original but linked to it by a nonmaterial concept.
â The original version of the therapeutic paradigm developed by Albert Ellis, Rational Emotive Therapy (RET), was renamed to Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy (REBT) in 1992.
Despite its limits, surely this is a better orientation than that of the British Raj officers of yore, who in the great tradition of Royal Society vivisections and other such doings obtained a wealth of information about elephantine physiology by restraining the animals and applying pain to find the most sensitive pressure points, coldly taking notes on their new knowledge of the nervous system. But the dilemma remains: how to get an accurate understanding of the animals’ nature and (if appropriate) emotions, without imposing on them assumptions born of a distinctly human understanding of the world?
Well before Quine and Davidson were debating the incommensurability ofmeanings, linguists had been exploring similar ideas. EdwardSapir (1929), a student of Boaz, had proposed two interrelated theses:linguistic determinism according to which language influences the waypeople think, and linguistic variation, according to which languageshave profound differences in syntax and semantics (these terms are notSapir's, but exist in the literature). Together, these twotheses entail linguistic relativity: the thesis that speakers ofdifferent languages differ in how they perceive and think in virtue ofspeaking different languages. Sapir's student, BenjaminWhorf (1956), speculated that languages encode fundamentally different“logics,” which become so habitual to language users thatthey seem natural, resulting in fundamentally different ways ofunderstanding the world. For example, Whorf speculates thatspeakers of Hopi are anti-realists about time, since tense in thatlanguage is expressed using epistemic modals, which describe events asrecalled, reported, or anticipated, in lieu of past, present, orfuture. Sapir and Whorf's relativism about language has come tobe known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. These two have beencriticized for offering insufficient support. They had limitedknowledge of the languages they discuss, and throughout theirdiscussions, they infer cognitive differences directly from linguisticdifferences rather than testing whether language causes (or evencorrelates) with difference in thought.
Prof Gothe commented that, “The breathing and meditative exercises aim at calming the mind and body and keeping distracting thoughts away while you focus on your body, posture or breath. Maybe these processes translate beyond yoga practice when you try to perform mental tasks or day-to-day activities.”
Researchers are not even supposed to name their subjects, lest the sense of intimacy in a name compromise their objectivity. The primatologist Jane Goodall was among the first to revolt from this convention, and now most elephant ethologists go ahead and name their subjects too; as Iain Douglas-Hamilton , “even if you identified an elephant by the number M51, when you saw him coming your way, you would still say to yourself, ‘My God, it’s ’”
Recent research has shown that mantra-based . An improvement in attention, emotional state and memory was also noted. Therefore, it’s likely that people with cognitive impairments or memory loss will benefit from meditation.